PAUL'S APPEAL TO THE EMOTIONS
IN 2 CORINTHIANS 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16

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I

Rhetorical analysis of Paul's epistles has focused on the invention of the logical proofs and the disposition of these elements in the text.¹ The value of this kind of criticism has been demonstrated by illumination of the topics, figures, and structures of Paul's argumentation. However, ancient rhetorical theorists, from Plato to Hermogenes, emphasize the importance of the pathetic proofs, or appeals to the emotions, in the creation of persuasive discourse.² The object of this essay is to identify and analyze the appeals to the emotions in a portion of canonical 2 Corinthians, the portion chosen according to the criterion of style.³


3. On the importance of the criterion of style, or type, in the composition of epistles, see H. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief (KEK, 6; repr.; Göttingen:
In a famous discussion of composition in the *Phaedrus* (264a–274b), Plato explains that the true art of composition lies in the use of the elements, or devices, of a speech, severally and in combination, to produce persuasion (το δε ἑκαστα τούτων πιθανως λέγειν τε και το ολον συνίστασθαι, 269c2-4). The appropriate selection and distribution of elements in a text depend upon what the text is trying to achieve, the effect which it aims at producing. However, this can be determined only on the basis of a psychology, a science of the soul, which discloses what effects one ought to pursue and how they may be achieved (269c6–274b5). Only such a science will tell the speaker what arguments to use with what person, and when to speak and when to keep silent (271e2–272a8).^4^

As is well known, Plato’s understanding of rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία, the art of enchanting the soul (*Phdr.* 271c10), exercised an influence upon Aristotle.\(^5\) It was Plato’s emphasis upon psychology, the need to understand character and the way character is influenced by argument and by emotional appeals, that led Aristotle to promote πάθος from an element of the peroration of a speech to an important form of artistic proof.\(^6\) In the first half of Book 2 of his *Rhetorica*, Aristotle provides a thorough analysis of the disposition of mind that creates the emotions, the types of persons in whom they are likely to be aroused, and the means by which they are produced.\(^7\) It is evident that Aristotle thinks of the λόγος as a whole and thinks of its effectiveness as being largely dependent upon ‘putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind’ (ἐν τω τον ἄκροατην διαθείναι, 1.2, 1356a2). A properly constructed speech is

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^6^ Kennedy, *Persuasion in Greece*, p. 94.

one that produces the desired psychological effect.

It does not appear that this attitude toward ψυχαγωγία, that is, the recognition of its importance in the creation of coherent discourse, carried the day among Hellenistic rhetoricians. To be sure, Cicero asserts (De Inv 2.2.6–3.9) that Aristotle’s theory was one of the primary sources of inspiration for the later τεχνογράφοι. But the surviving handbooks illustrate that many rhetoricians continued to relegate the appeal to the emotions to the beginning and end of the speech. Cicero’s own De oratore proceeds along Aristotelian lines: the theory of the affectus is separated from the exposition of the partes orationis. The stirring-up of the emotions is regarded by Cicero as one of the principal tasks of the orator; it should permeate the whole speech, all the parts of which are directed toward ψυχαγωγία (2.77.310-12). Students of Cicero’s speeches may conjecture that the reason why he laid such stress upon the movere audientium animos and preferred a theory by which appeals to the emotions were legitimate in every part of the speech was that it corresponded to his own experience and accounted for his practical success as an orator. But the issue is not whether the Aristotelian tradition was the exception or the rule in the history of ancient rhetoric. Rather, the issue is whether Aristotle’s inclusion of ψυχαγωγία among the principal objects of the art of rhetoric provides a basis for analyzing a speech or a text. Implicit in Aristotle’s scientific treatment of ψυχαγωγία and the Platonic postulates upon which it is based is the reason for the close association, in the minds of ancient theorists, between the pathetic proof (ἡ διὰ τοῦ πάθους πίστις) and the art of composition. Knowledge of how to put the hearer into a certain frame of mind necessarily involves both a teleological and an aetiological moment, and thus embraces the whole

10 Cicero, De Orat 2 48 185–52 211, cf Solmsen, ‘The Orator’s Playing upon the Feelings’, pp 396-99
11 Solmsen, ‘The Orator’s Playing upon the Feelings’, pp 400-401
process of composition. Plato insists that one who wishes to write a proper speech must consult their own function in selecting and composing their materials; the speaker’s whole effort is concentrated on attempting to implant conviction (ὡκοῦν ἡ ἀμιλλα αὐτῶ τέταται πρὸς τὸ τούτο πάσα: πειθῶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ, Phdr. 271a1-2)—that is, his procedure is teleological.12 But this goal can only be attained if the speaker is able, in the first place, to define rather precisely the nature of the auditor’s soul, and secondly to describe by what means it can be acted upon (δὴλον ἂρα ὅτι...δὲς ἀν σπουδὴ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν δίδω, πρῶτον πάση ἀκριβέια γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν...δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἡ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν, Phdr. 271a4-11). Aristotle fulfilled Plato’s project of an aetiological treatment of the πάθη. Aristotle does not simply state that certain hearers are susceptible to certain πάθη, but goes on to explain the reasons why, in each case, by analyzing the psychological bases for appeals to the emotions.13 It is because the appeal to the emotions embraces the origins and ends of discourse that it provides an important tool of literary analysis.

Recognition of the importance of ψυχαγωγία in the ancient theory of composition suggests that an analysis of Paul’s appeal to the emotions in 2 Corinthians may contribute something to our understanding of this complex letter. The pathetic proofs are crucial to 2 Corinthians, because this writing was occasioned by the Corinthians’ emotional response to a previous epistle (2.1-4) by which Paul had caused ‘pain’ (λύπη). In this subtle meditation on the problems of mutual understanding (1.13-14), Paul grounds the possibility of an authentic emotional response upon the community of affection established through participation in the πάθηματα Χριστοῦ (1.3-7).

II

Two qualifications must be introduced before proceeding with the investigation. First, Plato’s attempt to correlate the types of discourse (τὰ λόγον [γένη]) and the types of souls (ψυχῆς γένη) in Phdr. 271b

suggests that he viewed the soul as fixed and unchangeable; different kinds of souls are persuaded by different types of discourse. Plato speaks in the recapitulation of his argument of the orator’s need to identify the various ‘natures’ among his prospective audiences (τῶν ἀκουσμένων οί φύσεις, 273d-e; cf. 270b-c, 277c). There is no suggestion here of variability in the same soul on different occasions. Plato does not anticipate the modern dynamic view of the soul in situational flux. This limitation must be borne in mind when assessing the significance of the Platonic postulates for Paul’s appeal to the emotions of the Corinthians.

The second qualification relates to the importance of style or genre. In the view of ancient literary theorists, the criteria of composition are always relative to genre. This qualification is necessary to give substance to Plato’s abstract statements about the composition of a text. It is not enough that a text should have order; it must have the order ‘belonging’ (οίκειος) to it (Plato, Grg. 506c2-4); each product must have its own ‘form’ (εἴδος, Grg. 503e1-3). In practice this means that the speaker will ‘classify the types of discourses as well as the types of soul, and the various ways in which souls are affected, explaining the reasons in each case, fitting each type of speech to each type of soul, and showing what kind of speech can be relied on to create belief in one soul and disbelief in another, and why’ (διαταξάμενο τα λόγων τε και ψυχής γένη και τα τούτων παθήματα δίεισι πάσας αιτίας, προσαρμόττων ἐκαστον ἐκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκων οία οὕσα ύψιν οίων λόγων δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἀπείθει, Phdr. 271b1-5). Therefore, in assessing the construction of a text, one must always ask whether the functions of the genre are fulfilled; whether a segment of text or a sequence of segments achieves the effects appropriate to a text of that type, subject to any constraints imposed by that genre.

In the case of 2 Corinthians, we may limit our investigation to a portion of text whose ‘conciliatory’ style has long been recognized. Hans
Windisch\textsuperscript{19} suggested that the sections 1.1–2.13 and 7.5-16 bear comparison with the ‘conciliatory’ (\(\text{θεραπευτική}\)) type of letter described in the handbook on epistolary style, sometimes attributed to Libanius: ‘The conciliatory style is that in which we conciliate someone who has been caused grief by us for some reason’ (\(\text{θεραπευομέν τινα λυπηθέντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς περί τινος}\)).\textsuperscript{20} The sample letter which the author provides illustrates how well 2 Cor. 1.1–2.13 and 7.5-16 correspond to the type:

The conciliatory letter In addition to making the statements that I did, I went on (to put them) into action, for I most certainly did not think that they would ever cause you sorrow. But if you were upset by what was said or done, be assured, most excellent sir, that I shall most certainly no longer mention what was said. For it is my aim always to heal my friends rather than to cause them sorrow.

A number of examples of conciliatory epistles have fortunately survived—by Demosthenes (Ep. 2), Cicero, (Ad Fam. 5.8), Apollonius of Tyana (Ep. 45) Marcus Aurelius (Philostratus, Vit. Soph. 2.1.562-63), and others.\textsuperscript{22} Recognition of the importance of genre in ancient

\textsuperscript{19} Windisch, \textit{Der zweite Korintherbrief}, p. 8


\textsuperscript{21} Malherbe, \textit{Ancient Epistolary Theorists}, pp. 76-77 See also no 107 (\(\text{θεραπευτική}\)) of the exempla found in certain codices of Ps -Libanius in V Weichert, \textit{Demetrn et Libami qui feruntur ΤΥΠΟΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΚΟΙ et ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΜΑΙΟΙ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΕΣ} (Bibliotheca Teubneriana, Leipzig Teubner, 1910), pp 62-63

composition aids in the search for relevant parallels to the pathetic proofs of 2 Cor. 1.1-2.13 and 7.5-16.23

III

How are the pathetic proofs of 2 Cor. 1.1-2.13 and 7.5-16 to be identified? The matter is complicated both by the turbulent history of Paul’s relationship to the Corinthians24 and by the rich palette of affective capacities at Paul’s disposal.25 Paul recollects emotions that predominated at moments in the past (e.g., \( \lambda \upmu \nu \pi \eta \) in 2.1-4) and looks forward to emotions that he hopes will prevail in the future (\( \chi \alpha \rho \alpha \) in 2.3; 7.16; \( \dot{\iota} \gamma \omicron \omicron \pi \eta \) in 2.8). Paul gives added motivation to his counsel of forgiveness (in 2.5-11) by momentarily evoking fear of Satan and his designs (2.11). How is one to determine whether an emotion that Paul seeks to elicit belongs to the pathetic proofs,26 or plays a subsidiary role in his argument?

Two criteria prove useful in seeking to classify the emotional appeals of 2 Cor. 1.1-2.13 and 7.5-16.27 The emotions that belong to the pathetic proofs are (1) those Paul seeks to arouse in his readers and (2) those to which sustained appeal is made.28 Sometimes Paul seeks to

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27. The criteria are inferred from the discussion of the pathetic proofs in Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.2.3, 5; Cicero, *De Orat.* 2.42.178; 2.44.185-87; Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 5.12.9-12; 6.2.20-24.

exploit an emotion he believes to be present in his readers. At other times, Paul himself exemplifies the emotion he wishes to inspire in the Corinthians. But in every case, the emotions that belong to the pathetic proofs are those Paul seeks to elicit in his readers (in order to make his own case more convincing and his opponents’ case less), and which receive consistent elaboration. Application of these basic criteria should make it possible to distinguish between emotional appeals that constitute the pathetic proofs and feelings that are touched upon, but only play a subsidiary role.

Special caution must be taken in assessing the significance of lexical evidence. Sometimes the emotion that Paul seeks to arouse is mentioned explicitly, especially when he assumes that it exists in his readers (ζῆλος in 7.7). But it is often the case that the strength of an appeal is enhanced by a strategy that leaves the emotion in question unspoken. The power of feeling resides in silence and is diminished by being named. This elementary psychological observation should prevent one from seeking lexical confirmation for the emotions to which appeal is made in every case. It should also restrict the search for parallels on the assumption that the mention of an emotion constitutes an appeal.

In the final analysis, the identification of the emotional appeals must be made by the critic on the basis of careful rhetorical and exegetical analysis of the text itself. Aristotle, Cicero, and other rhetorical theorists provide a helpful framework. But Aristotle acknowledges that his list of emotions is not exhaustive (Rhet. 2.1.8). Nor should one assume that Paul’s understanding of the emotions coincides with that of Aristotle or other rhetorical theorists at every point. Paul does not adhere to the precise Aristotelian distinction between φθόνος and ζῆλος, for example. Ancient rhetorical theorists offer pointers, but the pointers are always open to question: perhaps the ancient theorist is tendentious. Reference to ancient rhetorical theorists does not permit an escape from the hermeneutic circle; it only gives the circle a tighter orbit and a clearer atmosphere.

29. As is the case with other textual features, e.g. the logical proofs, the ethical proofs, the disposition of the argument, etc. Rhetorical analysis remains subservient to the goals of historical criticism—contra J.D.H. Amador, ‘Revisiting 2 Corinthians: Rhetoric and the Case for Unity’, NTS 46 (2000), pp. 92-111.

30. Note the expression καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιάτα in Rhet. 2.1.8.
a. Pity

The first emotion to which Paul appeals in 2 Cor. 1.1–2.13 and 7.5-16 is pity (ἐλεος). Paul seeks to evoke feelings of pity in his readers throughout this portion of the epistle, by mentioning his suffering in general in the exordium (1.3-7), by recounting a specific, life-threatening experience of affliction in the narratio (1.8-11), and by representing himself as one who has suffered undeserved mistreatment at the hands of opponents (2.5-11), and has endured anxiety at separation from his friends (2.4, 12-13; 7.5) in the probationes. Indeed, Paul does not let go of the appeal to pity until he dramatizes the transformation of his suffering into consolation through an account of reunion with his emissary Titus (7.6), who brings news of the repentance of the insubordinate church (7.7-13).

The importance that Paul assigns to pity in this portion of the letter corresponds to the role that this emotion played in the theory of the παθη. As Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 6.1.23) says: 'but the appeal which will carry the most weight is the appeal to pity (plurimum tamen valet miseratio), which not merely forces the judge to change his views, but even to betray his emotions by tears'. It is a measure of how much is still at stake for Paul in 2 Corinthians that he should appeal repeatedly to such a powerful emotion.

The attempt to evoke pity reveals the ambivalent attitude that Paul has toward the Corinthians. According to Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.6), 'it is those who are between the two extremes that feel pity'. Evidently, Paul regards the Corinthians as no longer antagonistic, but not yet supportive; no longer sceptical, but not yet confident. The appeal to pity also discloses how Paul sees himself. As Aristotle states (Rhet. 2.8.2), the person who excites pity is one who has suffered a grief that he does not deserve.

The structure of the appeal to pity in 2 Cor. 1.1–2.13 and 7.5-16 follows the prescriptions of the rhetoricians. Cicero (De Inv. 1.55.106) explains that in seeking to arouse pity, it is first necessary 'to make the

31. On ἐλεος, see Anaximenes, Rhet. 34.1, 1439b17-18; Aristotle, Rhet. 2.8.1-16; Rhet. ad. Her. 2.31.50; Cicero, Brutus 50.188; Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 6.2.20; Anonymous Seguerianus, Rhet. 456.20-27 (Spengel).
32. Martin, Antike Rhetorik, p. 162: 'Die Hauptrolle bei der Verwendung des παθος spielt der ἐλεος, οἰκτος, die commiseratio'.
auditor’s spirit gentle and merciful that he may be more easily moved. This ought to be done by the use of commonplaces (loqui communes) that set forth the power of fortune over all men and the weakness of the human race." Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 6.1.51) adds that in the prooemium, the speaker has the opportunity to arouse briefly feelings of compassion in the hearers by speaking of his own painful experiences in the past and of those that he expects in the future.34 Accordingly, Paul begins the epistle by speaking briefly and very generally of ‘all our affliction’ (πάσα η ἠθλίψις, 1.4) and of ‘the sufferings that we suffer’ (τὰ παθήματα ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν, 1.6). By leaving the nature of the affliction unspecified, and by the consistent use of the present tense, Paul creates the impression that his constant experience is one of suffering.35 The image of the afflicted apostle who is constantly in need of divine consolation is calculated to soften the hearts of the Corinthians and prepare them to be moved by a lament (conquestio).

Three further points in the exordium contribute to the appeal to pity. First, Paul asserts that the experience of suffering with Christ is one that the Corinthians share or can expect to share (1.6-7). Paul thus brings the suffering near to the Corinthians.36 Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.2) explains that pity is heightened by the expectation that a painful experience that has undeservedly befallen another will come upon us or upon our friends, that is, that it will come near. Second, Paul insists that his affliction is on behalf of the Corinthians, for the sake of their consolation and salvation (1.6). Paul is consoled, so that he may be able to console others who are in affliction (1.4). Paul thus reveals an altruistic dimension to his suffering.37 He presents himself as the mediator of divine consolation.38 Cicero understood that ‘highmindedness’ (magnificentia) in the midst of affliction ‘does more to arouse pity than humility with entreaty’ (De Inv. 1.56.109). Among the loci misericordiae that Cicero lists in his De inventione is the topic ‘in which we show that our soul is full of mercy for others, is still noble, lofty and patient of misfortune, and will be so whatever may befall’ (1.56.109).

34. Martin, Antike Rhetorik, p. 162.
36. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 42-43.
37. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 39, citing as a parallel Cicero, De Fin. 3.20.66: ‘itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat, ipse non tradat alteri’, etc.
Third, the style in which Paul speaks of his affliction in the exordium contributes to the feeling of gravity: the repetition of a number of words (παράκλησις, θλίψις, πάθημα) creates a complex and effective traducilo.39 Cicero advises the orator to affect a grave style in the use of the ‘commonplaces’: ‘When such a passage is delivered gravely and sententiously, the spirit of man is greatly abased and prepared for pity, for in viewing the misfortunes of another he will contemplate his own weakness’ (De Inv. 1.55.106).

The lament for which Paul has prepared his readers is delivered in the narratio (1.8-11), where Paul recounts a specific, life-threatening affliction that he has recently experienced in Asia.40 The extraordinary power of this brief narrative is a result of the combination of extreme reticence in the description of the external data of the experience with intimate disclosure of the subjective, emotional state that it produced.41 Taken as a whole, the passage portrays the care, anxiety, stress, privation, and, above all, pain and torment, such as would have resulted from imprisonment.42 The natural result was that Paul ‘despaired of life itself’ (1.8b).

In his depiction of an experience of ‘deadly peril’ (1.10), Paul follows the best advice of the rhetoricians for evoking pity. Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.2) states that what most excites pity is the sight of an evil which is ‘deadly or painful’ (φθαρτικός ἤ λυπηρός). Among the distressing things that arouse pity, Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.9) lists first ‘various kinds of death’ (θάνατοι), then ‘injurious treatments of the body’ (αικίαι σωμάτων). Among those who are most pitied, Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.16) names those who are ‘at the point of death’ (οίον ἡδη τελευτώτων). Paul skillfully portrays his affliction in Asia as an experience of death. Using a terminus technicus of legal proceedings, Paul says: ‘We felt that we had received the death sentence (τὸ ἀπόκριμα τοῦ

39. On the traducilo, see Cicero, De Orat. 3.206; Rhet. ad Her. 4.20. On repetition as a figure in Greek rhetoric, see J.D. Denniston, Greek Prose Style (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 80-81.


41. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 44-46.

In the purpose clause of v. 9, Paul suggests an analogy between his deliverance and resurrection from the dead. In v. 10 Paul names the affliction from which he has been saved as ‘so great a death’ (τηλικούτος θανάτος).

Numerous devices in the narratio contribute to the piteous affect. The disclosure formula in v. 8a, οὐ γὰρ θέλομεν υμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, signals the importance and the novelty of what follows. The representation of the affliction as a recent occurrence is in keeping with the advice of the rhetoricians. Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.14) observes that ‘sufferings are piti­able when they appear close at hand, while those that are past or future…either do not excite pity at all or only to a less degree’. The address, ἀδελφοί, which appears here for the first time in the epistle, makes clear to the Corinthians their involvement in Paul’s suffering. Aristotle (Rhet. 2.18.3) explains that ‘men pity those who resemble them in family; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well’. As ‘brothers’ of Paul, the readers must naturally take a warm interest in the difficulties that he has experienced.

The extreme brevity of the description of the danger in which Paul found himself belongs to the devices of pity as well. Indeed, the entire experience is compressed into a single verb, ἔβαρήθημεν, unless the expression τὸ άπόκριμα τοῦ θανάτου is to be taken literally.


45. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, p. 45.

46. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 46-47; Furnish, II Corinthians, pp. 113-14.

47. Rhet. ad Her. 4.30, 41; Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 9.2.54; Martin, Antike Rhetorik, pp. 290-91.
dant evils—interrogation, mistreatment, and torture. By contrast, Paul provides an expressive account of the psychological effect of the experience: the affliction was ‘overwhelming’ (καθ’ ὑπερβολήν) and ‘unbearable’ (ὑπὲρ δύναμιν); he was so utterly at a loss that he ‘despaired of life itself’ (ἐξαπορήθηναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, 1.8). He regarded himself as one upon whom the ‘death sentence’ had been passed (1.9a). According to Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.14-16), the disclosure of the thoughts and words of the one who is suffering, especially one who is at the point of death, makes the case seem more pitiable.

Paul affirms that the experience of an unbearable affliction had the purpose that he might trust entirely in God and not in himself (ίνα μη πεποιθότες ὑμεν ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ, 1.9b). This affirmation not only attests Paul’s religious character, but also serves to make clear his helplessness and weakness, and thus makes him appear more pitiable. Among Cicero’s loci misericordiae is that in which ‘one’s helplessness and weakness and loneliness are revealed’ (De Inv. 1.55.109). Contrary to expectation, Paul was rescued from danger by God (1.10). Paul now avers that he is able to hope and that his life has become a blessing and an occasion of thanksgiving to others (1.11). The resilience of Paul’s spirit in his escape from suffering also enhances the piteous affect. Aristotle (Rhet. 2.8.16) observes that ‘when men show themselves undaunted (σπουδαῖος) at critical times it is especially pitiable’.

Throughout the narratio, Paul employs exaggeration, not only in the double prepositional phrase, καθ’ ὑπερβολήν ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, which portrays the unbearable weight of affliction, but also in the strengthened verb ἔξαπορέομαι, and in the strengthened adjective τηλικούτος. One suspects that exaggeration is also present in the ominous technical term ἀπόκριμα τοῦ θανάτου. Not surprisingly, exaggeration is one of the

48. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 45-46; Furnish, II Corinthians, pp. 113-14.
51. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 46-47.
52. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 45-46, 48; Furnish, II Corinthians, pp. 113-14.
means which Apsines (*Rhet.* 12) adduces for arousing the emotions.

Paul does not restrict his appeal for pity to the opening sections of the epistle, but looks for opportunities to elicit compassion in the *probatio* as well, as Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 6.1.51, 53) advised the clever orator to do. In the *probatio* Paul argues by ‘counter-plea’ (*ἀντίστασις*, *comparatio*)\(^{53}\) that his actions were to the Corinthians’ advantage; he was motivated by concern for the Corinthians’ well-being. When Paul desired to visit Corinth, and repeatedly made plans to do so (1.15-16), it was in order to do the Corinthians a ‘favor’ (*χάρις*). When he refrained from coming to Corinth (1.23; 2.1-2), it was in order to ‘spare’ (*φειδόμενος*) the Corinthians ‘grief’ (*λύπη*). By demonstrating his sincere concern for the Corinthians, Paul makes himself worthy of pity.\(^ {54}\) Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.8.7) states that men feel pity when they think that someone is ‘kind’ (*ἐπιεικής*) toward them. Indeed, Paul insists that his attempt to be kind to the Corinthians brought pain (*λύπη*) upon himself, as he internalized the tension in their relationship. Paul reveals that he wrote to the Corinthians ‘out of much affliction and anguish of heart...through many tears’ (2.4). This vivid portrait of Paul’s suffering on behalf of the Corinthians illustrates the accuracy of Aristotle’s observation (*Rhet.* 2.8.14) that ‘those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice...and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable’.

Paul also argues by ‘counter-accusation’ (*ἀντέγκλημα*, *relatio*)\(^ {55}\) that the Corinthians themselves are to blame for the grief that his letter caused. Within this argument, Paul represents himself as one who has suffered undeserved mistreatment at the hands of a ‘wrong-doer’: Paul has been caused ‘pain’ (2.5); he has something ‘to forgive’ (2.10); he is the ‘wronged party’ (7.12).\(^ {56}\) Among the topics that evoke pity, Cicero (*De Inv.* 1.55.107) lists that in which ‘one mentions shameful, mean, and ignoble acts that one has suffered...that are unworthy of their...

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position or preferment'. Cicero also adduces the topic in which ‘we complain because we are being badly treated by those whom such conduct least becomes’, such as ‘friends whom we have treated kindly, whom we expected to help us’ (De Inv. 1.55.109).

Finally, the account that Paul gives in 2.12-13 and 7.5 of the anxiety he endured while he awaited news of the Corinthians’ response to his painful epistle serves to awaken the pity of his readers. Cicero (De Inv. 1.55.109) recommends that one who appeals for pity should ‘deplore separation from someone, as when you are torn apart from one with whom you have greatest pleasure, for example...a brother, or intimate friend’. Paul vividly portrays the restlessness of his mind and body during his voluntary exile from Corinth, by using the figure of repetition (in 2.12-13 and 7.5) to heighten the emotional effect.

Examination of extant conciliatory epistles illustrates the importance of the appeal to pity in letters of this type. The second epistle of Demosthenes is an apology to the council and assembly of the Athenians designed to bring about the exiled orator’s restoration. Having exonerated other defendants in a previous epistle (Ep. 3), Demosthenes acknowledges cautiously that he committed ‘a slight offence’ and appeals for ‘forgiveness’ (άλλα καν μέτρι έξαμαρτών συγγνώμη$ τευξεσθαι,/ζρ. 2.1). In the prooemium (Ep. 2.1-2) Demosthenes strikes virtually every pose recommended by the rhetoricians for stirring pity: he represents himself as the victim of a conspiracy, unjustly condemned to perilous exile, deprived of homeland, property, and the company of those who are nearest and dearest. The description of his precarious and ignominious situation (in Ep. 2.13) constitutes a strong bid for pity according to the commonplaces of ‘contrary to deserts’ and ‘contrary to expectations’. Employing aporia, the orator laments:

61. Cf. Anaximenes, Rhet. 34, 77; Aristotle, Rhet. 2.8.2.
'Since my present troubles are so abundant I am at a loss to know what I shall bemoan first. Will it be my advanced age...perilous exile...the disgrace of having been convicted and ruined...disappointment of my hopes' *(Ep. 2.13).*

In two respects, in particular, the *commiseratio* of Demosthenes' epistle resembles the pathetic proofs of 2 Cor. 1.1–2.13 and 7.5-16. First, Demosthenes presents himself as one who is at the point of death. He asserts that, if no reconciliation is possible, it were better for him to be dead *(έπει ἐγε μοι τὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀδιάλλακτα ὑπάρχει, τεθάναι μοι κρειττον ἦν, Ep. 2.21).* He reminds the Athenians that he gave them the opportunity to sentence him to death when he proposed that they investigate the Harpalus affair *(Ep. 2.22).* Indeed, Demosthenes intimates that he is contemplating suicide and denies that he is indulging in idle bluff *(Ep. 2.22).* Then, the orator emphasizes his separation from the Athenians and his longing to return as a factor that enhances his suffering. He insists, 'It was on you my thoughts were centered and on no others' *(Ep. 2.18).* In a manner calculated to stir yet more pity, he portrays himself as a refugee in the sanctuary of Poseidon in Calauria: 'from here I look across the sea every day to my native land, toward which I am conscious in my heart of feeling an attachment as strong as I pray that I may enjoy on your part' *(Ep. 2.20).*

Marcus Aurelius wrote a letter of apology to his friend and former teacher Herodes Atticus. A quarrel between Herodes and his fellow-Athenians had come before the emperor’s court *(Philostратус, Vit. Soph. 2.1.550-61).* The verdict in the case went against the sophist: his freedmen were punished and Herodes was forced to make financial concessions. From self-imposed exile at Oricum in Epirus, Herodes addressed a letter of complaint to the emperor. Thereupon, Marcus wrote to Herodes a letter of reconciliation which has been partly pre-

63. Demosthenes ended his second exile in 322 BCE by taking poison.
served in Philostratus’s *Lives of the Sophists*. In the first section, the emperor dwelt upon his present sufferings, describing the rigors of the military quarters where he was at the time (διαλεχθείς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ πολέμου χειμαδίων, ἐν οἷς ἦν πότε), and lamenting his wife of whom he had recently been bereaved by death (καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ὁλοφυράμενος ἀρτί αὐτῷ τεθνεόσαν εἴπὼν), and making some remarks upon his own bad health (τέ τι καί περί τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενείας ἐφεξῆς).

The motive of the *commiseratio* is not only to account for the suspension of correspondence, of which Herodes had complained, but also to establish a basis for reconciliation in the commonality of affliction. Upon reflection, it is clear why the appeal to pity plays such a large role in the conciliatory type of letter. The one who is conciliated has suffered pain or grief within a relationship as a result of what was said or done. The offence may be explained or justified in a variety of ways. But before the aggrieved party can let go of the insult so that healing may occur, he must come to see that suffering belongs to the accidents rather than the elements of friendship. Nothing serves to make clear the commonality of affliction better than an account of the suffering of the one who has caused sorrow. In the feelings of pity that are thereby aroused, annoyances and resentments are dissolved.

b. *Anger*

Although it may seem paradoxical, Paul seeks to arouse feelings of anger in the conciliatory portion of his letter. The appeal to this emotion fortifies Paul’s argument that the Corinthians themselves, and one of their number especially, are to blame for the grief that has been caused (2.5-11). Paul handles this emotion cautiously, owing to the ambiguity of his situation. Paul desires to bring about the forgiveness and reconciliation of a certain unnamed member of the Corinthian community who has done wrong (7.12) and who has caused pain (2.5). But like many another author of a conciliatory letter, Paul understands

66. Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.* 2.1.562-63. Philostratus states that he extracts from the letter only that which bears upon the narrative.


68. Ps.-Libanius no. 66, 11.24-25: σκοπὸς γάρ μοι θεραπεύειν ἀεὶ τοὺς φίλους ἐστίν ἦπερ λυπεῖν.

69. See the perceptive comments of Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, pp. 83-84.
that the identification of the individual who is principally responsible for alienation and the evocation of anger against him serves the process of reconciliation. Hence the appeal to anger plays an important, though circumscribed, role in the conciliatory portion of 2 Corinthians.

Aristotle's discussion of anger in the *Rhetorica* (2.2.1-27) illuminates several aspects of Paul's appeal to this emotion. The philosopher begins with a definition: "Let us then define anger (οργή) as a longing, accompanied by pain (μετὰ λύπης), for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved" (*Rhet.* 2.2.1). As in a textbook case, Paul speaks first of pain (ει δὲ τις λελύπηκεν, 2.5) which is the concomitant of anger, then makes clear that all of the Corinthian Christians, and not himself alone, have been affected by the slight (οὐκ ἐμε λελύπηκεν, ἀλλὰ...πάντας ὑμῶς, 2.5). Later, Paul makes explicit what is hinted at in 2.5, namely, that the slight which produced pain was wholly undeserved: Paul describes the unnamed individual as 'the wrongdoer' (ὁ ἁδικήσας), and the one who was most affected by his actions as 'the one who was wronged' (ὁ ἁδικηθείς, 7.12).

Three inferences from Aristotle's definition clarify elements of Paul's strategy for arousing anger. First, Aristotle concludes that an effective appeal to this emotion will focus upon a particular individual: "the angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally)" (*Rhet.* 2.2.2). This practical, psychological observation explains why Paul focuses upon one member of the Corinthian community and the pain that he has caused, when the complicity of the majority is presupposed throughout, and at points comes cautiously to expression (φειδόμενος ὑμῶν, 1.23; ἀφ' ὦν ἐδεί με χαίρειν, 2.3; ἵνα μὴ ἐπιβαρῶ, 2.5; ἐλυπήθητε εἰς μετά- νοιαν, 7.9; etc.). Although Paul omits to mention the name of the

70. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, p. 85.
wrongdoer, in the interests of reconciliation, the pronouns that Paul uses—τις (2.5), οἱ τοιούτος (2.7), αὐτός (2.8), ὁς (2.10)—indicate that a particular individual is intended. The pronouns force the reader to supply, ‘you know whom I mean’. The cryptic expression ὁ ἁδικήσας in 7.12, for all of its indefiniteness, makes one thing clear: it is a case of a specific individual. Paul’s emphasis on the individuality of ‘the wrongdoer’ is not only a reflection of his prominence in the affair; it is a calculation of the most effective means of arousing anger in the Corinthians.

Second, Aristotle explains that an appeal to anger will emphasize the person to whom wrong has been done or is about to be done and his friends (Rhet. 2.2.2: καὶ ὃτι αὐτόν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τι πεποίηκεν ἢ ἡμελ-λεν). This observation illuminates the ambiguities of Paul’s references to himself in 2.5 and 7.12. Paul seeks to efface himself from the memory of a difficult situation to encourage the forgiveness of the wrongdoer (2.7) and to make clear that he bears no personal animosity (2.10). Yet, the reader is left in no doubt that it is Paul himself who is the victim. Indeed, the cautious diction of the passage, the allusive style and the inexact expressions, contribute to the gravity of the offence. The sense of the expression οὐκ ἐμὲ...ἀλλὰ...πάντας ὑμᾶς in 2.5 is clearly ‘not only to me...but...to you all’, and the point of the formulation is to impress upon the congregation that they have also been affected by the wrongdoing. Moreover, the majority of commentators correctly perceive the rhetorical intention of the apostle when they identify Paul himself as the ἁδικηθέντος of 7.12.

Third, Aristotle states that ‘anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come’ (Rhet. 2.2.2). This frank acknowledgment supplies the psychological rationale for the recollection of the ‘punishment’ (ἐπιτιμία) imposed upon the wrongdoer by the majority in 2.6. Whether the ‘punishment’ took the form of exclusion

75. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 84-85; Furnish, II Corinthians, p. 389.
77. On Paul’s motivation in this passage, see P. Schmeidel, Die Briefe an die Thessalonicher und an die Korinther (HCNT, 2.1; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1892),
from the community or reprimand before the congregation,\textsuperscript{78} the administration of the penalty belongs to the past. Paul does not mention it here to give instructions upon the process, as he does in the case of the incestuous man in 1 Cor. 5.1-5. Indeed, one cannot even say from the way in which the matter is formulated, whether ‘this punishment by the majority’ is identical with the verdict that Paul would have rendered.\textsuperscript{79} The ‘punishment’ inflicted by the majority is recollected here in order to declare the penalty ‘sufficient’ (ικανόν), and to clear the way for forgiveness and consolation (2.7). But entwined with this merciful motivation is the undeniable pleasure that accompanies the thought of the redress of a wrong.

The nature of the offence that has occasioned anger is not named by Paul in 2.5-11. But judging from the way in which Paul describes its effect, that is, ‘pain’ (λύπη), it would seem to fall into the category of the most serious kind of slight, namely, ‘insult’ (ὑβρις);\textsuperscript{80} for Aristotle specifies ‘pain’ (λυπεῖν) and ‘injury’ (βλάπτειν) as the effects of insult (Rhet. 2.2.3). Later, when Paul speaks more explicitly of the wrongdoing (7.12), his language implies an action with legal or financial implications, for δακτείν τινα is to do someone an injustice or injury (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.10.3),\textsuperscript{81} specifically in a financial transaction.\textsuperscript{82} If the Corinthians understood that Paul had been insulted, they also would have inferred that he had been disgraced. Disgrace is the result, Aristotle elaborates (Rhet. 2.2.5), of the injury or pain caused by insult. This inference would have further aroused the Corinthians’ anger.

It also belongs to Paul’s appeal to anger that he repeatedly insinuates that he had a right to expect that he would be well treated by the Corinthians in general and by a certain individual in particular. The phrase ἀφ’ ὅν έδει με χαίρειν in 2.3 suggests a duty that the Corinthians have neglected. The imperfect ἔδει with the complementary

\begin{itemize}
  \item p. 220; Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, p. 86.
  \item 78. Cf. 1 Cor. 5.11; 2 Thess. 3.14; 1 Tim. 5.20; Josephus, War 2.143-44; Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 86-87; Furnish, II Corinthians, p. 155.
  \item 79. Schmeidel, Die Briefe an die Korinther, p. 220; Krenkel, Beiträge, pp. 305-306; Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, p. 86.
  \item 80. Contra Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, p. 238, who restricts the meaning of ὑβρις to ‘insult’.
  \item 81. Cf. 2 Cor. 7.2; Gal. 4.12; Acts 25.10; Sir. 4.9; 13.3; Krenkel, Beiträge, p. 305; Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, p. 238.
  \item 82. Cf. 1 Cor. 6.7-8; Phlm. 18; Philo, Spec. Leg. 4.34; Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, p. 238; Thrall, ‘The Offender and the Offence’, pp. 73-76.
\end{itemize}
infinitive calls to mind a previous situation in which Paul did not receive from the Corinthians the joy he had every right to expect.\textsuperscript{83} The interrogative phrase καὶ τίς ὁ εὐφραίνων με in 2.2 not only expresses, as a general principle, Paul's hope of deriving joy from the Corinthians, it also gestures toward a particular individual from whom Paul has not received what he expected, but who has instead caused grief (2.5). Aristotle supplies the rationale for Paul's argument: 'men are angry at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to expect to be well treated' (\textit{Rhet.} 2.2.8). Such persons include 'those on whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits' (\textit{Rhet.} 2.2.8), 'those who are their friends...and those who have been in the habit of honoring them and treating them with respect, if they no longer behave so towards them' (\textit{Rhet.} 2.2.15-16).

Aristotle concludes his discussion of anger by advising the orator to make clear to the hearers that his opponents are responsible for the anger they feel: 'It is evident then that it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence...to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry' (\textit{Rhet.} 2.2.27). Paul concludes his attempt to arouse anger in the Corinthians by a reference to the one who is ultimately responsible for what the Corinthians have suffered—Satan, ancient adversary of the righteous (2.11). This eschatological gesture is a highly successful resolution of Paul's complex purpose in this section of the epistle: thereby the blame is wholly transferred from the earthly to the spiritual plane, thus relativizing the culpability of the wrongdoer, and uniting Paul and the Corinthians in anger against a common enemy. Nor is Paul's reference to Satan and his designs merely an expression of the common Christian notion that the devil inspires every iniquitous act (cf. 1 Cor. 7.5). The term that Paul uses in 2.11 to describe Satan's attempt to take advantage of the Corinthians, πλεονέκτειν, is the very term which his opponents had employed to accuse him of defrauding the Corinthian church in 12.17-18.\textsuperscript{84} Indeed, the description of Satan as a πλεονέκτης evokes an especially harsh passage in 2 Cor. 10-13 where Paul characterizes his opponents as 'servants of Satan' (11.13-15). Thus Paul implies that his opponents, rival missionaries, have manipulated

\textsuperscript{83} Windisch, \textit{Der zweite Korintherbrief}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{84} G. Delling, 'πλεονέκτειν', \textit{TDNT}, VI, pp. 266-67; Furnish, \textit{II Corinthians}, pp. 158, 559.
the wrongdoer, that he acted under their satanic influence.\textsuperscript{85} Without naming the opponents explicitly, Paul's reference to Satan in 2.11 calls to mind those whom the apostle regards as truly responsible for the grief that the Corinthians have experienced. They are the kind of people with whom the Corinthians are appropriately angry.

The appeal to anger is a regular feature of conciliatory letters, corresponding to the catalytic role anger plays in the process of reconciliation. In his appeal for restoration from exile (\textit{Ep. 2}), Demosthenes seeks to arouse anger against those principally responsible for his condemnation. Like Paul, Demosthenes makes clear to the Athenians that they have also been harmed by the actions of his accusers, who chose 'to play the game of politics to your detriment' (\textit{Ep. 2.6}). Like Paul, again, Demosthenes avoids mentioning the names of his accusers, in order to mitigate the harshness of blame. He speaks only of 'certain members of the council' (τίνες τῶν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ) who had contrived undue ascendancy for themselves (\textit{Ep. 2.2}).\textsuperscript{86} Like Paul, Demosthenes reminds the Athenians that they found the secretiveness of these men 'deserving of censure' (ἐπιτιμησέως δὲ ἑαυτοῖς, \textit{Ep. 2.2}). Demosthenes further inflames the anger of his readers by portraying his present anxiety as the result of the menacing power of his accusers: 'the fact that it is in the power of unfriendly people to deal with matters as they choose renders frail and unpredictable the safety of a man in danger' (\textit{Ep. 2.20}). Demosthenes concludes his appeal by arguing that the Athenians ought to be angry with those who refuse reconciliation and who persist in attacking him, when others have been pardoned. He urges: 'If they attempt to continue malicious, I appeal to you all to rally to my aid and not to allow the enmity of these men to prevail over the gratitude due to me from you' (\textit{Ep. 2.26}).

Cicero wrote a conciliatory letter to Crassus (\textit{Ad Fam. 5.8}) after a quarrel had interrupted the reconciliation effected by Pompey earlier in the year (cf. \textit{Ad Fam. 1.9.20}). Though Cicero is careful to avoid any statement that would reopen the quarrel, he seeks to arouse anger against those who are the cause of estrangement. Cicero explains:

\begin{quote}
But indeed I never lacked will to cultivate your friendship and contribute to your advancement. Only certain persistent fellows, whom it hurts to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{85} W. Bousset, \textit{Der zweite Brief an die Korinther} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908), on 2.11.

\textsuperscript{86} Goldstein, \textit{The Letters of Demosthenes}, p. 158.
hear others well spoken of, estranged you from me more than once, and at times changed my attitude to you.

The letters of Apollonius of Tyana reflect a dispute with his brother about money and the hurt feelings and suspicion that resulted from their misunderstanding (Ep. 35, 44, 45). In the first of three epistles devoted to the subject, Apollonius refers to certain unnamed persons in his brother’s locale (τοῖς αὐτῶι) who purport that he travels abroad in pursuit of wealth rather than virtue (Ep. 35). Ep. 45, the letter of reconciliation with his brother, is followed in the collection by an epistle ‘To Gordius’ (Ep. 46), threatening the recipient with consequences if he continues ‘to wrong’ (ηδικῆσθαι) his brother. Apollonius angrily warns the person who has been the cause of alienation: ‘Beware then, Gordius, lest you find yourself in conflict not with the semblance of a man, but with the reality!’ (Ep. 46).

In his conciliatory letter to the sophist Herodes Atticus, Marcus Aurelius turns his ‘anger’ (ὀργή) against Herodes’ freedmen, as Philostratus notes (Vit. Soph. 2.1.561). In the portion of the letter that Philostratus preserves, the emperor assures his friend and former teacher of his good will, while deflecting anger upon certain unnamed members of Herodes’ household: ‘And do not regard yourself as unjustly treated (μηδὲ ἠγείσθαι ἀδικείσθαι), if after I detected the crimes of some of your household, I chastised them with a punishment as mild as possible (εἰ καταφωράσας τινὰς τῶν σῶν πλημμελοῦντας κολάσει


In each of these cases, as in the conciliatory portion of Paul’s epistle, the appeal to anger plays a well-defined role. By arousing anger against a third party who is held responsible for the alienation, any lingering feelings of resentment are purged, so that the relationship may be re-established.

c. Zeal

The third emotion to which Paul appeals in 2 Cor. 1.1–2.13 and 7.5-16 is zeal (ζῆλος). Paul wishes to move the Corinthians beyond concern for what he has suffered and desire to redress the wrong to an ardent longing for the intimacy and confidence of their old relationship (7.7, 11). Indeed, Paul hopes that the trying experiences through which they have recently passed will result in the revelation of a sincere regard for his person and a desire to emulate his life, of which the Corinthians have not hitherto been completely conscious (7.12b). Paul seeks to achieve this purpose by holding up before the Corinthians the highest goods, purity (7.11) and salvation (7.10), as attainable by the Corinthians because of the virtuousness of their conduct as reported by Titus. In this account of a response that redounds to the Corinthians’ credit, there is only one shadow: the recognition, in retrospect, that the Corinthians had something of which to repent (7.9-10). But even the recollection of a feeling of grief belongs to the rhetorical strategy for arousing zeal.

Aristotle’s account of the frame of mind in which persons feel zeal and of the things that give rise to it (Rhet. 2.11.1-7) throws a brilliant light upon Paul’s aims and methods in 7.5-16. Aristotle defines ζῆλος as follows: ‘a feeling of pain (λύπη) at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are naturally possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the fact that we ourselves do not’ (Rhet. 2.11.1).

Aristotle’s insight into the nature and motivation of zeal explains why Paul devotes so much attention to the Corinthians’ ‘pain’ (λύπη) in a section where he seeks to affirm their obedience. Zeal arises from pain at the recognition of a good which one lacks. Accordingly, Paul mentions ‘longing’ and ‘mourning’ as the feelings that preceded ‘zeal’.

90 Cf. Philostratus, Vit. Soph. 2.1.561; Oliver, Marcus Aurelius 25-27.
in Titus’s account of the Corinthians’ emotional response (7.7). ἐπιπόθησις is yearning, and deep desire.91 ὀδύρωμος is mourning and lamentation, a strong term for the pain of the Corinthian community.92 Eight times in six verses (7.8-13a), Paul mentions the Corinthians’ λύπη, like a formula recited over an initiate. In 7.10, Paul provides two definitions of λύπη, constructed in sharp antithesis, to make clear to the Corinthians that there is a positive role for grief in the life of the spirit, if grief makes one zealous of salvation.93

Aristotle’s explanation makes it possible to understand how Paul can now acknowledge what he earlier denied (2.4, ἔγραψα ὑμῖν...οὐχ ἱνα λυπηθήτε), namely, that he meant to cause the Corinthians grief with his previous epistle (7.8).94 Now he can admit that he gave pain, and can even reveal a momentary sense of regret (εἰ καὶ μετεμελομην), because the Corinthians’ zeal for goods of the highest value proves that they are virtuous. Aristotle elaborates on his definition: ‘Emulation (ζηλος) is therefore virtuous (ἐπιεικές) and characteristic of virtuous men’ (Rhet. 2.11.1). ‘Necessarily, then, those are emulous (ζηλωτικοί) who hold that they have a claim to good things which they do not possess (although they are within their grasp).95 Hence...the high-minded (οὶ μεγαλόψυχοι) are emulous’ (Rhet. 2.11.1-2). To speak of the Corinthians’ sorrow and repentance in this context (7.9-11) is no longer to imply their complicity in wrongdoing, but to affirm the virtuousness of their character.

Finally, Aristotle’s exploration of zeal illuminates the role that Paul assigns to himself in the process of the Corinthians’ repentance and obedience. Aristotle insists that zeal is not motivated by the perception of valued goods in the abstract, but ‘in the possession of those who naturally resemble us’ (Rhet. 2.11.1). Aristotle names as objects of emulation those who possess goods such as courage, wisdom, and authority (Rhet. 2.11.5). Accordingly, Paul emphasizes himself as the possessor of the goods of which the Corinthians are zealous. He speaks to the Corinthians not of zeal in general, but of ‘your zeal for me’ (7.7).

91. Furnish, II Corinthians, p. 386.
92. Cf. Jer. 31(38).15; 2 Macc. 11.6; Mt. 2.18; Plato, Rep. 9, 578A; Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, p. 228.
94. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, pp. 81, 229-30.
He summarizes: ‘So I wrote to you...in order that your zeal for us might be made known to you before God’ (7.12).

The appeal to zeal is consistently found in letters of reconciliation. Demosthenes uses the Athenians’ zeal for justice and honor to motivate them to bring about his restoration (Ep. 2.1-12). Demosthenes contrasts the Athenians’ temporary surrender of their constitutional rights with their present, virtuous resolution to decide the cases in light of the evidence (Ep. 2.1-2). He mentions the mistreatment he has suffered at Athens in order to make the Athenians concerned about their reputation abroad (Ep. 2.3). The orator recounts his own achievements in public life, not only to defend his conduct, but also to make the Athenians emulous of his virtue and magnanimity. Thus he emphasizes that all the Athenians share the credit for his career. He asserts: ‘The record upon which I passed scrutiny as your servant was of such a kind as to make you envied (ζηλούσθαι) by all because of it’ (Ep. 2.5). Demosthenes characterizes his refusal to be corrupted by bribes as ‘a fact that brings to you also cause for pride’ (Ep. 2.8). He assures the Athenians that his aim in all the embassies upon which he served was ‘to further measures from which I thought a reputation for magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία) would redound to you’ (Ep. 2.11).

In his conciliatory epistle to his brother Hestiaeus, Apollonius of Tyana seeks to arouse zeal by reminding him of the way of life they embraced when they became philosophers (Ep. 45). He argues that their misunderstanding on the point of money is inconsistent with philosophy, ‘the most precious thing (το τιμιώτατον) in existence’. Apollonius urges Hestiaeus to credit him with possession of the virtues of philosophy, and he will no longer suspect his brother of having neglected their correspondence for some mean or illiberal reason.

Marcus Aurelius seeks to move his old teacher Herodes Atticus beyond a feeling of resentment against him by appealing to his legitimate desire for justice (Philostratus, Vit. Soph. 2.1.562). Marcus urges: ‘But if I grieved you in anything, or am still grieving you (ει δε τι λειτύηκα σε η λυπώ), demand reparation (ἀπαίτησον δίκας) from me in the temple of Athene in your city at the time of the Mysteries’ (Philostratus, Vit. Soph. 2.1.563). Revealing that he has made a vow to be initiated and expressing the wish that Herodes should initiate him into

96. Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes*, p. 159
the rites (Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.* 2.1.563), the emperor suggests that there are higher religious aims of which they should both be zealous, and in common pursuit of which they will find themselves restored to friendship.99

Pity, anger and zeal are the emotions that Paul seeks to arouse in the conciliatory sections of 2 Corinthians. These three feelings work together to accomplish the goal of this portion of the epistle as announced in the *propositio* (1.12-14): to restore the Corinthians’ faith in Paul’s sincerity and confidence in their relationship (cf. 7.16). The consistency with which appeals to these emotions appear in ancient letters of reconciliation demonstrates that these proofs were deemed appropriate to the function of this type of discourse. Writers who sought to conciliate their friends regarded the souls of their aggrieved readers as susceptible to these πάθη in particular.

IV

If we would understand more precisely the nature of Paul’s appeal to the emotions in the conciliatory portion of 2 Corinthians, then we must recognize that the apostle not only seeks to arouse certain πάθη in the souls of his readers, he also seeks to transform these feelings into passions that are consonant with the sufferings of Christ. Paul accomplishes this transformation by dramatizing the conversion of emotions in his own soul. He then seeks to lead the Corinthians to the recognition of the genuineness of their mutual affection as the cause of their eschatological boast (1.12-14). Presupposed in this undertaking is a conception of authentic emotion and a faith in the community of affection that is grounded in participation in the παθήματα Χρίστου.

The first indication that Paul aims at something more than the production of certain emotional effects is found in the *exordium* (1.3-7), which takes the form, not of a ‘thanksgiving’, as is customary in Paul’s epistles, but of a ‘blessing’.100 In all of Paul’s letters, with the exception of Galatians, he begins with a ‘thanksgiving’ for the rich spiritual gifts of his readers.101 But in the case of 2 Cor. 1.3-7, Paul pro-


101. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, p. 36.
nounces a ‘blessing’ (εὐλογία, berakhah) upon God for the consolation he has personally experienced in the midst of affliction, and draws the readers into the blessing only insofar as they share, or wish to share, in his suffering and consolation.\(^{102}\) The rationale for the replacement of the regular εὐχαριστῶ formula by the more liturgical εὐλογητὸς form is usually sought ‘in the particular situation which called forth this letter’.\(^{103}\) Exegetes assume that Paul has intentionally omitted the ‘thanksgiving’, as in Galatians, because the spiritual life of the Corinthian community was disoriented and imperiled.\(^{104}\) But one must not forget that in Corinth, unlike in Galatia, a decisive turn for the better has already occurred (7.7-11), resulting in the repentance and obedience of the once-rebellious church.\(^{105}\) The explanation for the replacement of Paul’s customary ‘thanksgiving’ must be sought elsewhere.

By employing the form of the εὐλογία, Paul is able to locate the source of the emotion he feels, not in the giftedness of the Corinthians, but in the fullness of his own heart, which overflows with praise for unexpected deliverance. Like the Psalmist of old,\(^{106}\) Paul declares God ‘blessed’ because of the consolation he has personally experienced in the midst of affliction (1.3-4). On this basis, Paul dramatizes, in the narratio that follows (1.8-11), the transformation of ‘despair’ into ‘hope’. Paul goes on, in subsequent sections of the letter, to dramatize the transformation of ‘sorrow’ into ‘love’ (1.23-2.4; 2.5-11), and of ‘fear’ into ‘joy’ (2.12-13; 7.5-16). What is the point of this richly detailed account of changes in Paul’s emotional states throughout the course of the epistle?

In offering a dramatization of the transformation of his own emotions, Paul is not merely complying with the advice given to the orator that he should assimilate and then exemplify the feelings that he wishes

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105. Rightly, Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, p. 36.

106. E.g. Pss. 144.1; 27.6; 30.22; 40.14; *Pss. Sol.* 2.37; 6.6; cf. Dautzenberg, ‘Der zweite Korintherbrief als Briefsammlung’, pp. 3058-60.
to inspire in his hearers by ‘visibly stamping, or rather branding, these emotions into himself’ (Cicero, *De Orat.* 2.45.189). It is obvious that something more profound than a rhetorical device is involved: first, because it is not the affects which Paul wishes to produce in his hearers (pity, anger, and zeal) that he exemplifies, but his own emotions of despair, sorrow, and fear; and second, because he does not merely express certain feelings to give his words the appearance of sincerity, but dramatizes the process of transformation of these emotions into others which are more genuinely Christian—hope, love, and joy.

Rather, by dramatizing his personal emotional transformation, Paul leads the Corinthians to reconsider the quality of their own emotional response. 2 Corinthians was occasioned, in large measure, by the ‘grief’ (λύπη) with which the Corinthians responded to Paul’s painful epistle (2.4). The nature of the Corinthians’ response is a persistent and distressing symptom of the failure of mutual understanding, which is the eschatological goal of Christian community (1.13-14). Thus, Paul seeks to transform the Corinthians’ pity into hope (1.3-11, esp. 1.7, 10), anger into love (2.5-11, esp. 2.8, 10), and zeal into confidence (7.5-16, esp. 7.13-16). The criterion that guides the Corinthians towards authentic emotions is not an inner, psychological ideal. The criterion of authenticity is discovered through participation in ‘the sufferings of Christ’ (1.5-7), and is confirmed within the community of affection. Paul reaches beyond all-too-human emotions to Christ-like passions, in the conviction that ‘it is God who establishes us with you in Christ’ (1.21).

In 2 Corinthians an attempt at self-scrutiny comes to the surface which aims at nothing less than the discovery of authentic emotions. Paul’s influential predecessor in this undertaking is Plato in the *Phaedrus*. But unlike Plato’s philosopher, who seeks to discover the true state of the soul by recollection of the Forms, Paul attains to authentic emotions by participation in the ‘sufferings of Christ’ (1.5). Nor is the result of the analysis an enlightened philosopher in an ideal world, but a reconciled community of affection in which all share the same sufferings and joys (1.6-7; 7.13b-16).


ABSTRACT

The essay focuses attention on a neglected aspect in rhetorical analysis of Paul's epistles: the pathetic proofs, or appeals to the emotions. Following a sketch of the role of emotional appeals in the ancient theory of composition, criteria are delineated for identifying the pathetic proofs of a portion of canonical 2 Corinthians, the portion chosen according to the principle of style. The body of the essay consists of an exegetical analysis of Paul's appeals to the emotions of pity, anger and zeal in 2 Cor. 1.1–2.13 and 7.5-16 in light of the treatment of these emotions by ancient rhetorical theorists. A survey of ancient letters demonstrates that appeals to these three emotions were deemed appropriate to the function of the conciliatory style. A concluding section reflects upon Paul's attempt to bring about a christophoric transformation of the emotions aroused by his letter.
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